

Multi-agent systems

Andrej Lúčny

KAI FMFI UK

lucny@fmph.uniba.sk

<http://www.agentspace.org/mas>

Mobile robots based on subsumption architecture

ALLEN – room exploration

HERBERT – empty cans collection

TOTO – cognitive map building

METATOTO – navigation to a specified spot

COG – humanoid robot for learning by imitation

Mobile robots based on subsumption architecture




ALLEN



HERBERT



TOTO



COG

Alternatives to subsumption architecture

- Fine-grained alternative (Rosenblatt, Payton)
 - It supports data fusion, but need same type of data
- Behavioral systems (Arkin)
 - We apply just suppression to output of the layer
 - the layer has just one module


fine-grained architecture

- Similar to neural network
- One data type only: float $<-1,1>$
- Output from modules is synchronized in time to enable fusion of the output values (weighting, addition, normalization)
- Code in modules is very simple

Behavioral systems


- Layer corresponds to only module which generate certain behavior
- Thus modules are linearly sortable by priority
- Each behavior has condition of applicability and it can suppress behaviors implemented by modules with lower priority

Behavioral systems



Hybrid system

- Each module has to output a variant of robot output vector
- Then also data fusion can be considered



Mind modeling

- Can we model human mind in similar way than neural control of insects ?
- We can try, fruitfulness of this approach is questionable. Anyway we can employ multi-agent approach to imagine several interesting mechanisms which are probably present in our mind

Fodor theory


- Derived from rich set of brain injuries

**Modules are
mandatory**

(not controlled by
will)

**Modules are
domain specific**

(they have certain
function and it is
anatomically
localized)




Central system is
holistic

(it has not one
function and it
does work or not)

Fodor theory

- We do not know whether the ide of the central system is plausible, but we can model it:




Fodor thesis

- Modules are domain-specific
- Modules are mandatory
- The central system has limited access to data from modules
- Modules have different speed of data processing
- Modules are informatively closed
- Modules have shallow output
- Modules have fixed neural architecture
- Modules have typical decay courses

Fodor thesis

- Denial of connectionism (subsymbolic) approach
- Preference of computation-symbolic approach
- Compliance with Newell – Simon hypothesis




Minsky society of mind

- Mind is a society of agents. How structures do the agents form ?
- Explaining of Piaget experiments
- No unique representation but a strategy how to put different representations into one system
- How to grant that proper agent is activated in the proper time to generate proper overall behavior of system ?

Piaget experiments

- Where is more of water ?



- 4-years old and younger child select one glass
- 5-years old and more child comprehends that there is the same amount of water


How does the structure in child brain evolve ?

PKA model

P = perception

K = knowledge

A = action




Structures

- Polynemes
- Melanemes
- Pronoms
- Scripts
- Frames
- Memorizers
- Recognizers
- a further, all together 18 structures


Polynemes

- stimulus activates its attributes




Melanemes

- stimulus activates objects which have it as attribute




Pronomes




- enables manipulate variable objects

Scripts


- perform a sequence of steps



Frames




Memorizer



Recognizer

- opposite polyneme



And further ...


- all together Minsky has described 18 types of agent structures, so called agentures
- (btw. nowadays he uses term “resource“ instead of “agent”)

How can we employ Minsky structures for modelling ?

- It is too big job to model whole mind
- We can model a part
- If mind has such organization as Minsky supposed, it would be not perfect!
Yes, it is not.
- We can verify our model on mind failures

- How many dollars are in dozen ?
- And how many quarters ?


**FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-
SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-
IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE
EXPERIENCE OF YEARS**



Select one card and look on it per one minute

Abracadabra ...





Your card has left !

Failures of animal behavior


- Example of situatedness of recognizer
 - Goose treats phantom eggs by beak
 - bees ostracize bee on which we drop oleic acid
- Example of embedded script
 - Digger wasp mating behavior



Features of Mind

- Mind has no universal “world” model
- Representations in mind does not correspond to a consistent theory
- (Godel, Turing, Penrose, Wiedermann)

Mind does not handle exceptions



- Mind works like these three men planting trees: the first one is digging a hole, the second one is putting a seedling there and the third is digging the plant in. Imagine that the second one fails. What will happen?

